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Relation Between Rumination and Impaired Memory 
1n Dysphoric Moods 
Paula T Hertel 
Trinity University 
College students in dysphoric or nondysphoric moods studied pairs of words and later took a 
fragment-completion test of memory for targets from the pairs (under process-dissociation procedures 
for obtaining estimates of controlled and automatic retrieval; L. L. Jacoby. 1996). Between the study 
and test phases. some participants waited quietly for 7 min; others rated self-focused materials 
designed to invoke ruminations in the dysphoric group; and still others rated self-irrelevant and task­
irrelevant materials. A dysphoria-related impairment in controlled retrieval occurred in the first 2 
conditions but not in the 3rd condition. These results show that the nature of task-irrelevant thoughts 
contributes to memory impairments in dysphoria and suggest that self-focused rumination might 
also contribute to similar impairments under unconstrained conditions that permit mind wandering. 
The cognitive correlates of depression and dysphoria are re­
vealed in two distinct patterns: On the one hand, depressed 
and dysphoric people are quite skilled at concentrating on self­
focused thoughts that seem to come to mind automatically 
(Ingram, 1990), and they can recall events related to their 
moods quite well (see the review by Gotlib, Roberts, & Gilboa, 
1996). On the other hand, they report concentration difficulties 
(e.g., Watts & Sharrock, 1985), and their deliberate attempts 
to remember emotionally neutral events are impaired (see the 
meta-analysis by Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995). In re­
sponse to these two seemingly diverse patterns, several reviews 
have advanced the hypothesis that the patterns are indeed re­
lated: Ruminations ( perseverating self-focused thoughts) might 
distract attention from the task at hand and thereby impair mem­
ory for neutral material (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). 
W hat sort of evidence can be found to support this hypothe­
sis? Two studies have been conducted to examine the relation 
between mind wandering and memory. Watts and Sharrock 
( 1985) asked patients with primary diagnoses of depression to 
report lapses of attention as they read a short story and then to 
listen to a different passage and recall it. The number of lapses 
was negatively correlated with the recall scores. Next, with a 
sample of nondepressed college students, Seibert and Ellis 
( 1991 b) examined the relation between letter recall and the 
proportion of irrelevant thoughts, which were either reported 
after recall or voiced aloud during recall. In both cases, the 
proportion of thoughts that were irrelevant to the task was nega-
A portion of these results was presented at the meeting of the Psy­
chonomic Society, November I, 1996. I thank Hallie Henderson, Kathy 
Le, Colleen Parks, Lisa Villareal-Rios. and Tiffany Weiscamp for their 
contributions in preparing materials, conducting the sessions, and scor­
ing the data. 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Paula 
T. Hertel, Department of Psychology, Trinity University, 715 Stadium 
Drive. San Antonio, Texas 78212. Electronic mail may be sent to 
phertel @trinity.edu. 
tively correlated with recall accuracy across all participants' 
data. Moreover, participants who had previously undergone ei­
ther positive or negative mood inductions recalled fewer letters 
and produced higher proportions of irrelevant thoughts than did 
those in a neutral control group. 
The results from both studies encourage the hypothesis that 
rumination-as one type of task-irrelevant thought-might be 
at least partly responsible for memory impairment, but certain 
characteristics of the procedures restrain the nature of the con­
clusions that can be reached. For example, Watts and Sharrock 
( 1985) alerted their participants to possible concentration diffi­
culties, first by conducting an hour-long interview on such diffi­
culties and then by asking them to report lapses as they read, 
before the memory task was administered. Similarly, in Seibert 
and Ellis's ( 1991 b) study, the mood-induction procedure itself 
encouraged the participants to voice free associations to the 
feelings that they were trying to establish (see Seibert & Ellis, 
199la), and this practice in mind wandering could have carried 
over into the memory task. Moreover, as discussed by these 
authors, when thoughts were reported after recall in Experiment 
1, the participants might have tried to justify their relatively 
poor performance by writing down more thoughts. Also, when 
participants stopped reporting their concurrent thoughts in Ex­
periment 2, they were reminded to think aloud. In short, conclu­
sions about the relation between irrelevant thoughts and memory 
in both studies are restricted to situations in which people are 
directly or indirectly instructed to focus on task-irrelevant 
thoughts. Moreover, the two studies were not designed to exam­
ine relations between memory and the sorts of task-irrelevant 
thoughts that characterize rumination in negative mood states, 
nor do they address the possibly causal role that rumination or 
other irrelevant thought might play in impairing memory. My 
experiment was therefore designed to shed some light on the 
question of whether "uninstructed" rumination impairs mem­
ory in negative mood states. 
Rumination should impair memory in situations that are 
poorly constrained. Only under relatively lax conditions of atten­
tional control would a person have the opportunity to entertain 
SHORT REPORTS 167 
self-focused thoughts that come to mind automatically. The more 
often that such thoughts are entertained under conditions of poor 
external control of attention, the more often similarly uncon­
strained intervals should cue their future occurrence; practice 
makes automatic (see Hertel, 1997). 
Perhaps not coincidentally, experimental paradigms that 
poorly control attention are the ones that produce depressive or 
dysphoric impairments on tests of deliberate remembering. In 
the real world as well as in the laboratory, many conditions of 
initial exposure and later memory tests are relatively uncon­
strained, in that they allow room for "choice" between mind 
wandering and self-sustained attention to the task. Unlike other 
people, depressed and dysphoric people show less initiative in 
staying on task (see Hertel & Hardin, 1990) and might experi­
ence mind wandering during these unconstrained intervals. For 
example, Hertel and Rude ( 1991 ) showed that when attention 
to the materials during 8-s exposures was not well controlled 
experimentally, clinically depressed participants did not recall 
them as well later on as did control participants, but when the 
task required sustained attention during the 8 s, they recalled at 
least as well as did the control participants. Of related interest 
is the finding that attention-demanding tasks have also been 
shown to disrupt rumination in depressed states (Teasdale et 
a!., 1995). 
Perhaps a main reason for the central role of attentional focus 
in establishing impairments is that the impairments are typically 
found on tests that require attention to the past, such as tests of 
free recall. Impairments are rarely found on implicit tests of 
memory, on which attention to the past is not required (e.g., 
Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Ful­
ler, 1992; but see Hertel, 1994), and their occurrence on recogni­
tion tests is spotty (see Watts, Morris, & MacLeod, 1987). 
Recognition has been shown to reflect two separable compo­
nents of retrieval (Jacoby. 1991): an automatic component, akin 
to what· some researchers term implicit memory, and a more 
controlled or recollective component, of the sort that dominates 
performance on explicit tests such as free recall. By using Jaco­
by's process-dissociation procedure to estimate each component 
separately, Hertel and Milan ( 1994) showed that only the con­
trolled component of recognition was impaired in a dysphoric 
sample. The controlled component of recognition and other 
memory tests reflects the degree to which attention is focused on 
the past; it is uncontaminated by reliance on automatic retrieval. 
Therefore, process-dissociation procedures were built into the 
design of my experiment, as a means of providing a more sensi­
tive measure of impairment. 
The design of this experiment was modeled in part on experi­
ments reported by Jacoby ( 1996) . In Phase I, related and unre­
lated word pairs were presented at a fast rate; participants read 
them aloud and were asked to try to remember them for a later 
test. Phase 3 was a fragment-completion test, in which inclusion 
and exclusion instructions from the process�dissociation proce­
dure were used to obtain estimates of the two components of 
memory. On this test, word fragments appeared with the related 
context word that some participants also experienced in Phase 
I (e.g., knee b _ n_).1 The logic of the process-dissociation proce­
dure for fragment completion is described next. 
On each test trial, a conte;l(.t-fragment pair was presented 
with one of two types of instructions: inclusion ("use old") 
or exclusion ("use new"). On "use old" trials, participants 
were told to complete the fragment with a word they remem­
bered from Phase I or, if they failed to remember such a word, 
to complete the fragment with the first word that came to mind 
that fit the fragment and is related to the context word. If con­
trolled and automatic bases for retrieval are assumed to be inde­
pendent, the probability that a target word from Phase I (e.g., 
bone) will be produced under "use old" instructions can be 
expressed algebraically as C + A ( I - C). This algebraic ex­
pression means that either the target is retrieved in a controlled, 
recollective manner (C) or, in the absence of such controlled 
retrieval ( I - C), it is automatically retrieved (A). In contrast, 
on "use new" trials, participants were told to try to remember 
such an old word but to complete the fragment with a new word 
(e.g., bend) that is related to the context word. In this case, 
the probability that an old word from Phase I would be used 
erroneously to complete the fragment is a function of that 
word's coming to mind automatically in the absence of its con­
trolled retrieval: A (I - C). To obtain an estimate of controlled 
retrieval for each participant, the proportion of Phase 1 targets 
used erroneously on ''use new'' trials is subtracted from the 
proportion of targets used correctly on ''use old'' trials, because 
C = [ C + A ( I - C)] - A ( I - C). Then estimates of A are 
obtained by substitution. These estimates for each participant 
served as the dependent measures of memory for assessing im­
pairments associated with dysphoria and the effects of the Phase 
2 manipulation, which is the essential part of the design for 
addressing the claim that rumination causes impairment. 
One purpose of Phase 2, the interval task, was to determine 
whet.her a dysphoria-related impairment in controlled retrieval 
would be found after a completely unconstrained interval of 7 
min between study and test. Such an interval was expected to 
provide ample opportunity for ruminations that would carry 
over into the test phase. Another purpose was to assess the 
likelihood that rumination would be responsible for poor con­
trolled retrieval in this unconstrained condition. To this end, 
an interval task that encouraged rumination (the self-focused 
condition) was included, as was a control condition in which 
participants thought about task-irrelevant and self-irrelevant 
matters (the neutral condition). Such irrelevant thoughts were 
presumed not to carry over to the test. 
The self-focused and neutral conditions were based on re­
search by Nolen-Hoeksema (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993). In a variety of studies, she examined the effects of 
rumination or distraction on momentary mood in depressed or 
dysphoric participants, in comparison with nondepressed or 
nondysphoric control participants. Unlike the control partici­
pants, depressed and dysphoric participants who were asked to 
contemplate self-focused phrases (e.g., my character and who 
I strive to be) experienced an increase in negative moods, as 
revealed by rating scales, and those who were asked to contem­
plate neutral statements (e.g., the way the Grand Canyon lo�ks 
at sunset) experienced a decrease. In other words, rummauon 
' The manipulation of relatedness in Phase I was used as a means of 
replicating Jacoby's ( 1996) finding that reinstating the related context 
on the test increased both components of fragment completion: The 
same context helps make the solution to the fragment come to mind 
automatically and helps conscious recollection of its prior occurrence. 
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and distraction exerted opposite effects on mood (also see Fen­
nell, Teasdale, Jones, & Damle, 1987). These materials therefore 
seemed suitable for investigating effects of rumination on mem­
ory, in spite of the possible confounds invited by the other 
ways in which they differed (e.g., concreteness). Therefore, 
dysphoric and nondysphoric panicipants in this experiment were 
assigned to one of the three conditions of the interval task ( un­
constrained, self-focused, or neutral). To keep attention focused 
appropriately in the latter two conditions, the participants were 
asked to rate the clarity of the idea suggested by each phrase. 
The primary prediction was a finding of similar differences in 
estimates of controlled retrieval between dysphoric and control 
samples in the unconstrained and self-focused conditions and 
a smaller difference in the neutral condition. Corresponding 
differences in the automatic component of retrieval were not 
expected. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
To categorize panicipants according to mood states, the Beck Depres­
sion Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 
was administered in introductory psychology classes at Trinity Univer­
sity. Because indications of anxiety. hostility. and depressed moods often 
coincide. the participants in this study are referred to as dysphoric or 
nondysphoric, to denote general unpleasant mood state or the lack of 
such a state. The scorer (author) gave the participation codes of students 
who scored 6 or below and 9 or above to the experimenters, who then 
consulted a code/name list and a general phone pool list and phoned to 
request panicipation in the e-xperiment. The experimenters did not know 
the BDI scores, and the scorer did not have access to the code/name 
list. The scorer randomly assigned the codes to experimental conditions. 
under the constraints of equal cell sizes within each mood group and 
gender.2 
Th� final sample included 36 dysphoric participants and 54 nondys­
phoric participants. One third of each mood group was assigned to each 
condition of the interval task (unconstrained. self-focused, and neutral); 
each combination of mood group and interval task was exactly balanced 
on gender and on the counterbalancing conditions for the study and test 
materials. 
Materials 
Study and test lists. Ninety sets of materials were selected from 
those used by Jacoby ( 1996). Each set consisted of a context word and 
two additional words, each of which was associatively or semantically 
related to the context (e.g .. knee. bend. bone). Because the two addi­
tional words shared at least two letters in the same position (e.g .. b_n_). 
they could each be used to complete the word fragment on the test . 
However. only one of the additional words in each set was selected for 
presentation as the target during the study phase. The second additional 
word-the alternate-was available for completing the fragment under 
"use new" instructions. 
Fifteen sets were assigned to each of six lists by balancing the lists 
on the mean frequency of the context words, tar_get words, and alternates 
and on the mean baseline completion rates for the target word and 
alternate. according to Jacoby ( 1996). These six lists were rotated across 
the six cells of the within-subjects design. 
One within-subjects variable was the study condition. During the 
study phase, participants were exposed to 30 related word pairs (e.g., 
knee bone) and 30 unrelated word pairs (constructed by re-pairing the 
contexts and targets within two of the sets of 15; e.g., knee truth and 
king bone). The remaining 30 pairs were reserved for new test items. 
Study List A consisted of Lists I and 2 as related pairs and Lists 3 and 
4 as unrelated pairs; Study List B contained Lists 3 and 4 as related 
pairs and 5 and 6 as unrelated pairs; Study List C contained Lists 5 and 
6 as related pairs and Lists I and 2 as unrelated pairs. 
The other within-subjects variable was test instruction. On one test 
list, pairs from the odd-numbered lists ( I, 3. and 5) were accompanied 
by "use old" instructions and the others (from Lists 2. 4, and 6) by 
"use new" instructions. The other test list contained the reverse pattern. 
Each study list of 60 word pairs was ordered randomly within the 
constraint that three pairs from each list (e.g., Lists I, 2, 3, and 4 for 
Study List A) appeared in each block of 12 pairs. Three additional 
buffer pairs appeared at the beginning and at the end of each list. These 
orders were fixed across participants assigned to each list. 
Each test list contained all 90 pairs of context words and fragments 
(e.g., knee b _n_) in a fixed order. The order was determined by randomly 
·selecting three items from each of the six lists to appear in each block 
of 18 items. Because of experimenter error. one list was preceded by 
six buffer items (two old related� two old unrelated, and two new) and 
the other by two additional old related items. The old items among the 
test buffers were taken from the study buffers. The two lists were other­
wise identical. except for the previously described reversal of instruc­
tions between items on Lists I, 3, and 5 and items on Lists 2, 4, and 6. 
Phrases for the interval.tasks. In the self-focused and neutral condi­
tions of the interval task, participants rated the clarity of 40 ideas sug­
gested by phrases. The phrases were taken from Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow's ( 1993) study and modified to exclude words appearing in the 
memory task or high associates of those words.' The order within each 
list was fixed, and some portion of the list was repeated, as needed. to 
fill the 7-min interval. 
Procedure 
First, participants were told that they would see a series of word pairs 
presented on the monitor and were asked to try to remember them for 
a later memory test. The pairs were presented at the center of the screen 
in white lowercase letters on a black background. The exposure duration · 
was 2 s, with a 500-ms interstimulus interval. In each interval-task 
condition, 4 dysphoric participants and 6 nondysphoric participants 
viewed each of the three study lists. 
Next, the participants in the unconstrained condition were asked to 
sit quietly in a chair on the other side of the room, while the experimenter 
ostensibly readied the next task. Instructions mentioned that they could 
think about whatever they liked but should not talk, read, or do other 
work. Participants in the self-focused and neutral conditions were in­
structed to use their imagination and concentration to focus on the idea 
suggested by each of a series of phrases and then to rate (on a 5-point 
scale) the clarity of that idea. On each trial in this rating task, the phrase 
appeared for 4 s in the center of the monitor and was followed by an 
instruction to rate the clarity of the idea that it suggested. After instruc­
tions. the experimenter moved to the other side of the room and read or 
worked quietly while the participants paced themselves through the task. 
2 Data from 14 participants were replaced because their BDI scores 
at the end of the experimental session were out of the initial range of 
the first administration. The data from 5 other panicipants were also 
replaced: One was not fluent in English, I had difficulty staying awake, 
I encountered a computer mishap during the session, and 2 clearly 
misunderstood the instructions. 
> Examples of phrases in the self-focused condition were what it 
would be like if your present feelings lasted; your character and who 
you strive to be; and your physical appearance. Phrases from the neutral 
condition included the layout of the local post office; the way the Grand 
Canyon looks at sunset; and the pattern on an Oriental rug. 
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fur the typical participant. the phrases were exposed for at least half of 
a second cycle through the list, before the interval timed out. 
Instructions for the test phase began 7 min after the start of the 
instructions for the interval task. The experimenter used examples to 
explain the instructions for "use old" items and "use new" items. 
Participants were told that if the instruction for the item was to use an 
old word, they should try to remember a word from the study phase 
that both completed the fragment and is related to the context word. If 
they could not remember such a word from the study phase. they were 
to use the first word that came to mind that fit the fragment and the 
context. If the instruction accompanying the pair was to use a new word. 
they were to try to remember an old word but not use it to complete 
the fragment; instead, they were to use a new word that fit the fragment 
and the context. If they could not think of such a new word, they 
could report the old word as a last resort and then say "old," but the 
experimenter stressed the importance of trying to think of a new word. 
Finally, for both sets of instructions. participants were also told that 
some of the old words did not appear with the current context word 
during the study phase. 
·The test items were presented in white lowercase letters in the center 
of a black background, on the same line after an instruction ("USE 
OLD" or "USE NEW"). The participants responded aloud, and the 
experimenter noted the response. out of view. The exposure duration 
for each test item was 10 s; after the item disappeared, the experimenter 
waited a short interval. to allow participants to respond if they had not 
previously done so, before advancing the program to the next item. 
After the memory test, the experimenter presented a packet containing 
the BDI, other forms, and an envelope. The participants were assured 
that the experimenter would not see the contents of the envelope. which 
they sealed after completing the forms. They· were then debriefed about 
the nature of the memory task. Last. the participants in the self-focused 
condition were each shown clips from "Saturday Night Live" for ap­
proximately 7 min. 
Results and Discussion 
Separate analyses of variance ( ANOVAs) were performed on 
each of the· dependent measures indicated by the headings that 
follow. Effects either not reported or reported as nonreliable 
were accompanied by p values greater than .I 0. Reliable main 
effects that were qualified by reliable interactions are reported 
without accompanying statistics. All overall analyses were per­
formed with gender as a variable; when this variable did not 
qualify any of the reliable effects, the data were collapsed across 
gender in the reported analyses. 
Target Proportions (Base Rates) 
The "raw" dependent variable in the memory task was the 
proportion of trials in which the participant produced a target 
word for the fragment.' This measure serves to index baseline 
performance on fragments for words not presented in Phase I 
(new fragments); it was evaluated in an ANOVA with between­
subjects variables for group (dysphoric and nondysphoric) and 
interval task (unconstrained, self-focused, and neutral) and a 
within-subject variable for instructions ("use old" vs. "use 
new''). The means are reported in the top section of Table I. 
In this analysis of base rate responding, the main effect of 
instruction was reliable, but it was qualified by a reliable In­
struction X Group interaction, F( I, 84) = 6.56, MSE = 0.0068, 
p < .05. The nondysphoric participants produced an average 
of .26 targets in each instructional condition. The dysphoric 
partiCipants. however, produced more targets when they were 
asked to used an old word ( .30) than when they were asked to 
use a new word (.23 ) , F( I, 33) = 19. 20, MSE = 0.0048, p < 
.00 I. This difference suggests that they performed more conser­
vatively when asked to use a new word. and it violates the 
assumption regarding independence of the controlled and auto­
matic components of retrieval (see Curran & Hintzman, 1995). 
The effect of this violation is to render uninterpretable the esti­
mates of automatic (but not controlled) retrieval in the dys­
phoric group (see Jacoby, 1998). In this regard. it is also im­
portant to know that reliable main or interaction effects of the 
interval task were not obtained in base rate performance. 
When instructions to use old or new words are used in the 
process-dissociation procedure, an analysis of the full design for 
target proportions is uninformative, and so it was not performed. 
However. the proportion of targets used on ''old'' trials, the 
means for which are presented in the lower section of Table I, 
entered into the analysis of estimates of controlled retrieval. 
Estimates of Controlled Retrieval 
Two estimates of controlled retrieval were computed for each 
participant. Each estimate-one for targets presented with their 
related context words in Phase I and the other for targets pre­
sented with an unrelated context word in Phase 1-was com­
puted by subtracting the proportion of targets erroneously used 
on "use new" trials from the proportion correctly used on "use 
old" trials. These estimates were then submitted to an ANOYA 
with between-subjects variables for group and interval task 
and a within-subjects variable for relatedness of the pairs in 
Phase r. 
The reliable main effect for group5 was qualified by two 
interactions. First, dysphoria-related differences in conirolled 
retrieval depended on the interval task, F( 2, 84) = 3. 11, MSE 
= 0. 039, p < .05. Figure I depicts the mean estimates, collapsed 
across relatednes.s. As was found by Hertel and Milan ( 1994), a 
dysphoric deficit ( .20 vs . .  32) was obtained in the unconstrained 
condition, in which participants merely waited for 7 min, F( I, 
28) ,;, 5.59, MSE = 0.038, p < .025. This deficit also occurred 
in the self-focused condition and disappeared in the neutral 
condition. In lighi of the rationale for the design, however, the 
interaction is best viewed in terms of the outcomes of two 
interaction comparisons: The interaction of group with the com­
parison between unconstrained and self-focused conditions was 
• There were 15 fragments for each cell of the within-subjects design 
of relatedness by instruction. However, because of experimenter error, 
Study List B presented two alternate words (instead of target words) 
during Phase I,  one of which was tested in under instructions to '·use 
old" and the other under instructions to "use new." These fragments 
were omitted in the scoring reported here, so that proportions out of 15 
fragments were scored for four of the cells. and proportions out of 14, 
for the other two. The patterns of reported results were nearly identical 
when all 15 were scored (including the two targets that varied across 
the study lists). 
�The finding of base rate differences in the dysphoric groups suggests 
that the dysphoria-related differences in controlled retrieval are underes­
timated. The dysphoric participants' more conservative approach to the 
exclusion trials. coupled with their more liberal performance on inclu­
sion trials, exaggerates their estimates (see Jacoby, 1998). 
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Table I 
Mean Target Proportions 
Dysphoric Nondysphoric 
Condition Free Self Neutral Free Self Neutral 
New fragments 
Use old instructions .28 .32 .31 .25 .25 .29 
Use new instructions .22 .24 .24 .27 .25 .25 
Old fragments 
Use old instructions .49 .45 .52 .51 .55 .54 
Use new instructions .29 .22 .18 .19 .19 .23 
n 12 12 12 18 18 18 
Note. Free (unconstrained), self (self-focused), and neutral refer to the conditions of the interval task. 
not reliable ( 1 < 1.0), but the interaction with the comparison 
between unconstrained and neutral conditions was indeed reli­
able, /(56) = 2.06, p < .05. These interaction comparisons 
were chosen a priori on the grounds that the two distracting 
conditions should reveal something about what rrtight be respon­
sible for the deficit in the unconstrained condition. In this regard, 
the overall Group X Interval Task interaction suggests that con­
trolled retrieval in a state of dysphoria is disrupted by focusing 
on oneself instead of on other task-irrelevant information. 
Group differences in estimates of controlled retrieval also 
depended on whether the targets had been presented with the 
same related context word or a different word in Phase 1, F( 1, 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
B Nondysphoric 
- Dysphoric 
Unconstrained Self-Focused 
Interval Task 
Neutral 
Figure 1. Mean estimates of controlled retrieval in each combination 
of group and interval task. 
84) = 4.43, MSE = 0.023, p < .05. (The main effect of relat­
edness was also reliable.) The dysphoric deficit was larger for 
related targets ( .35 for dysphoric and .48 for nondysphoric parti­
cipants) than for unrelated targets ( .16 for dysphoric and .19 
for nondysphoric participants). This interaction probably re­
flects floor effects in controlled retrieval when the context was 
not encountered with the target initially. 
Estimates of Automatic Retrieval 
Estimates of the automatic component of retrieval were also 
computed separately for related and unrelated pairs. Because of 
the previously described differences in base rates across instruc­
tions in the dysphoric group, an AN OVA on the estimates in the 
nondysphoric group was performed, with a between-subjects 
variable for interval task and a within-subjects variable for relat­
edness in Phase 1. Only the main effect of relatedness ap­
proached statistical significance, F( 1, 51) = 3.18, MSE = 
0.017, p < .10. Mean estimates were .31 for related pairs and 
.27 for unrelated pairs. Furthermore, only the related pairs 
showed true automatic influences of Phase 1 exposure above 
the base rate target production of .26, F( I, 51 ) = 4.29, MSE 
= 0.016, p < .05. 
BDI Scores 
These scores were used to verify the dysphoric state of partici­
pants who were preselected according to scores on the initial 
adrrtinistration and to determine whether participants' moods 
differed across the three interval conditions. In the latter regard, 
the dysphoric participants in the neutral condition scored at least 
as high, on average, as did the others, even though their estimates 
of controlled retrieval were much higher. Mean BDI scores in 
the dysphoric groups were 16 (unconstrained; SD = 6.5), 15 
(self-focused: SD = 4.3), and 17 (neutral; SD = 6.9). The 
ANOVA on scores in the dysphoric group revealed only a reli­
able gender difference, F( I, 30) = 5.87, MSE = 30.30, p < 
.025: Women produced higher scores (M = 18) than did men 
( M = 14). Mean BDI scores in the nondysphoric group were 
3 (unconstrained; SD = 2.3), 3 (self-focused; SD = I. 9), and 2 
(neutral; SD = 2.1 ) , and no reliable differences were obtained.6 
6 In the initial class administration, BDI scores of participants in 
the final dysphoric sample ranged from 9 to 44; on the end-of-session 
administration they ranged from 9 to 35. The scores of 6 participants 
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General Discussion 
As Hertel and Milan ( 1994) found in recognition, dysphoric 
participants' controlled retrieval was impaired, in relation to 
that of control participants, when the interval between study and 
test ).Vas unconstrained. A similar degree of impairment was 
experienced by participants who performed the self-focused task 
during the interval, and the impairment was eliminated by asking 
participants to spend the interval thinking about self-irrelevant 
matters. 
A comparison of performance after the two rating tasks sug­
gests that the nature of thoughts during retention intervals contri­
butes to impairments in controlled remembering. Although, on 
a priori grounds , other differences between the cognitive pro­
cesses invited by the two sets of phrases might affect later 
performance , it is difficult to argue that such effects would 
confound performance in the dysphoric groups only. Estimates 
of controlled retrieval did not differ reliably across the condi­
tions of the interval task in the nondysphoric group. 
The rationale for the rating-task manipulation in Phase 2 was 
to provide two possible analogues for thoughts experienced in 
the unconstrained interval (self-focused thoughts or self- and 
task-irrelevant thoughts). Estimates of controlled retrieval in 
the self-focused condition show a dysphoria-related deficit that 
was similar to the pattern in the unconstrained condition. It is 
clearly not certain that the dysphoric participants in the uncon­
strained condition entertained ruminative thoughts that impaired 
control. Even if self-reports had been requested from partici­
pants in this condition, however, the outcome would be merely 
correlational and possibly contaminated by reconstructive recall 
and demand characteristics as a function of individual perfor­
mance on the test. Furthermore, a request fo.r self-reports at the 
end of Phase 2 was judged to be intrusive and possibly influential 
at the time of the test. In short, there seems to be no uncontami­
nated method for establishing a causal link between uninstructed 
rumination and impairments in controlled retrieval. However, 
because the findings in the two other conditions of the interval 
task permit the causal inference regarding rumination and con­
trolled retrieval, they provide converging evidence for the hy-. 
pothesis that rumination in unconstrained intervals contributes 
to impairments in deliberate memory.7 
Finally, in light of previous findings of a relation between 
task-irrelevant thoughts and memory performance, it is im­
portant to speculate about whether the current results with dys­
phoric students would also be found in depressed samples. 
Should self-focused rumination be expected to be the only type 
of task-irrelevant thinking to impair control in depression? Evi­
dence for prefrontal hypoactivation in depression (e.g., Hen­
riques & Davidson, 1991 ) suggests that depressed people should 
have trouble sustaining and switching attention, regardless of 
whether potentially distracting materials are self-relevant. 
(see 
Hertel, 1997). Moreover, such a general deficit in at�enuonal 
control should be correlated with severity of depressiOn (se
e 
·1 fo nd in samples Johnson & Magaro, 1987) and not necessart Y u 
. . . s 10 scores increased.
 and :!0 
· d the dm1mstrauon · · remame same across a . 1 1 participant scored IJ. 4 
decreased. At the end of the sessto
n. Ol) Y 
scored I 0, and 2 scored 1 I. 
of dysphoric college students. Truly depressed people experi­
ence a high proportion of self-focused thoughts (Ingram, 1990), 
but such thoughts might merely characterize the nature of typical 
distractions; they might be sufficient but not necessary causes 
of difficulties in refocusing attention on the past as more pro­
foundly depressed people try to remember. 
7 T hat the results from the self-focused and neutral conditions were 
mediated by mood might be argued on the basis of Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow's (1993) findings in mood ratings after these tasks. In 
my experiment. the end-of-session packet contained scales for rating 
momentary feelings of depressed mood. Along with BDI scores, those 
ratings showed that after the test, the dysphoric participants in the neutral 
condition reported feeling at least as depressed as did those in the 
other two conditions. More in general, advancing a mood-mediation 
explanation of the results entails a potentially circular explanation of 
how negative moods impair memory. T he more parsimonious approach 
is to assume that rumination can temporarily exacerbate negative moods 
and. independently, carry over to impair controlled retrieval. 
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